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 1. A “geep” is a transgenic cross between a goat and a sheep.  See 
Rebecca Dresser, Ethical and Legal Issues in Patenting New Animal Life, 28 
JURIMETRICS J. 399, 406 (1988); Thomas A. Magnani, The Patentability of 
Human-Animal Chimeras, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 443, 445-46 (1999). 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Calling its task a narrow one of statutory interpretation2 
(interpreting 35 U.S.C. § 101–the patent statute), the Court in 
Diamond v. Chakrabarty3  approved a patent application for a 
multi-cellular life form.  Seven years later, the Patent and 
Trademark Office (PTO) declared that multi-cellular, non-
human life forms are patentable subject matter.4  Since then, 
many who believe that the Court and PTO’s decisions could 
have unfortunate results have voiced their objections.  They 
have noted the potential negative effects on family farms,5 on 
the environment,6 and on the animals themselves.7  
Nevertheless, since the Chakrabarty decision and the 1987 
PTO ruling, scientists have genetically engineered (famously) a 
mouse with a human gene that makes the mouse more 
susceptible to breast cancer,8 a “geep,”9 and many more new 
animals.10 
Controversy over such genetic modification of animals and 
plants has been growing considerably over the past decade, 
particularly in Europe and, increasingly, in the U.S.  “In 
England,” for example, “scarcely a day goes by without a 
headline questioning ‘Frankenstein Food’ or television images 
of protesters ripping up test plots of ‘transgenic’ plants.”11  As a 
result, “[t]he European Union, reacting to consumer fears and 
torn between differing opinions in its member states, has 
enacted a de facto moratorium preventing the import of 
 
 2. See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 318 (1980). 
 3. Id. 
 4. Patent and Trademark Office Notice: Animals-Patentability, 1077 
Official Gazette U.S. Pat. & Trademark Off. 24 (Apr. 21, 1987) [hereinafter 
PTO Notice]. 
 5. See infra text accompanying notes 100-110. 
 6. See infra text accompanying notes 112, 141-162. 
 7. See infra text accompanying notes 113-115, 116-140. 
 8. U.S. Patent No. 4,736,866 (Apr. 12, 1988). 
 9. See supra note 1. 
 10. One author counts “eighty-five genetically-engineered mice, three rats, 
three rabbits, a sheep, a bird, a fish, a pig, a guinea pig, an abalone, and a 
cow.” Magnani, supra note 1, at 444.  Another author counts “106 mice, 9 rats, 
9 rabbits, 8 sheep, 8 pigs, 7 cows, 7 goats, and one each of a nematode, bird, 
fish, guinea pig, abalone, canine, and turkey hen.”  Rochelle K. Seide & Janet 
M. MacLeod, Drafting Claims for Biotechnological Inventions, 585 PLI/Pat. 
381, 388 n. 10 (1999). 
 11. Veronique Mistiaen and Isabelle Bucq, Big Stakes Ride on Dispute 
over Crop Engineering, PORTLAND OREGONIAN, September 20, 1999, at A7. 
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transgenic products for at least the next 18 months.”12  Such 
concerns are significantly less in the U.S., but they appear to be 
on the rise.  In November 1999, forty-eight Members of 
Congress joined several groups in urging the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) to require that foods with genetically 
modified components be labeled.13  As a result of these 
expressions of concern, the FDA held several public comment 
meetings in November and December of 1999 and now requires 
that genetically modified foods be labeled if the foods represent 
a chance of a safety risk.14  Thus far, however, it is up to the 
biotechnology company to flag such potential risks.15  Yet, 
safety concerns only begin to address the myriad concerns to 
which transgenic foods give rise.  Some vegetarians might 
object to the presence of animal genes in their food, and some 
Jews might be concerned that kosher foods with genes of non-
kosher animals might enter their food supply in an 
unrecognizable way. 
Awareness of the potential harms of genetically modified 
foods comes, in part, from two highly-publicized discoveries in 
1999.  Pioneer Hi-Bred, International asked a University of 
Nebraska scientist to test a variety of soybean seed into which 
a Brazil nut gene had been introduced (to increase the bean’s 
protein level).16  The scientist discovered that the soybean 
caused an allergic reaction in people with Brazil nut allergies.17  
Similarly, scientists at Cornell University discovered that corn 
that had been genetically altered to produce an insecticide 
released pollen on nearby plants with the unexpected result of 
killing monarch butterfly larvae, potentially threatening the 
entire monarch butterfly population as well as threatening the 
plants and animals that rely on the monarchs.18  Nor have 
 
 12. Id. 
 13. See Rob Hotakainen, Farmers in Crossfire of Fight over Labeling 
Genetically Altered Food, MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIBUNE, November 13, 1999, at 
A1. 
 14. See FDA Announces Public Meetings on Bioengineered Foods (visited 
Jan. 15, 2000) <http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/NEWS/NEW00695.html>. 
 15. See id. 
 16. See Paul Jacobs, Protests May Mow down Trend to Alter Crops, L.A. 
TIMES, October, 1999, at A1. 
 17. See id. 
 18. See Rick Weiss, Biotech vs. “Bambi” of Insects? Gene-Altered Corn May 
Kill Monarchs, THE WASHINGTON POST, May 20, 1999, at A3.  While scientists 
disagree on the meaning of the studies of the effects of “Bt corn” on monarch 
butterflies, the latest study, conducted at Iowa State University, seems to 
confirm the earlier studies: it shows that this genetically-engineered corn does 
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transgenic animals, themselves, been free of alarming, 
unintended side effects.  Some of these transgenic animals have 
been horribly unfortunate, such as the pig with a human 
growth gene that unexpectedly grew to be “excessively hairy, 
riddled with arthritis, and cross-eyed,” seldom even standing 
up.19  The ability to create such animals comes with 
responsibilities.20 
The purpose of this note is to raise the visibility of the 
patenting of transgenic animals and to encourage active control 
of a process that has proceeded thus far without specific 
direction.  Part I surveys some of the arguments advanced by a 
wide variety of people affected by transgenic animal 
patenting.21  Part II, discusses first whether animals should be 
patented, reviewing both the ethical implications of modifying 
animal genetic structures and the safety concerns of transgenic 
animals.22  Part II, further, discusses potential solutions to 
these concerns, including that the PTO should revive the Moral 
Utility Requirement to ban or postpone patenting transgenic 
animals and that, simultaneously, Congress should act to enact 
a ban or a moratorium on such patents.23  Specifically, this note 
argues that given the number of unknowns and the number of 
unintended consequences of genetic modification of animals–
and the consequent public apprehension of these processes and 
products–Congress should pass legislation directing the PTO’s 
response to future applications for transgenic animal patents.24  
Congress should direct the PTO to discourage the commercial 
use of this technology—through a ban or a moratorium—until 
it is better understood.25 
 
 
threaten monarch butterfly populations.  See also Pollen from Altered Corn 
Can Kill Monarch Butterflies, MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIBUNE, Aug. 22, 2000, at 
A8. 
 19. Andrew Kimbrell, The Patenting of Life and the Global Market in 
Body Parts, in THE CASE AGAINST THE GLOBAL ECONOMY: AND FOR A TURN 
TOWARD THE LOCAL 131, 137 (Jerry Mander and Edward Goldsmith eds., 
1996). 
 20. See infra text accompanying notes 113-115, 116-140, 136-161 for a 
discussion of the responsibility scientists and the rest of society owe to 
technology-created animals. 
 21. See infra Part I, BACKGROUND. 
 22. See infra Part II.A, ANALYSIS: SHOULD TRANSGENIC ANIMALS BE 
PATENTED? 
 23. See infra Part II.B, ANALYSIS: WHAT RESPONSES ARE APPROPRIATE? 
 24. See infra CONCLUSION. 
 25. See id. 
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I.  BACKGROUND 
 
The U.S. Constitution reserves for the federal government 
the power to grant exclusive patents.26  It states, “[t]he 
Congress shall have Power . . . To promote the Progress of 
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to 
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective 
Writings and Discoveries. . . .”27  For Congress, parlaying this 
Constitutional delegation of power to grant patents into 
legislation was an early priority.  Thus, Congress passed The 
Patent Act in 1793.28  In its first three sections,29 the current 
patent statute identifies the three elements necessary for a 
patent.  The first identifies the general purpose of the statute 
and articulates the requirement that the invention be 
“useful.”30  The second explains the “novelty” requirement.31  
The third requires that the matter not be “obvious.”32 
In the twentieth century, Congress began to modify patent 
laws to account for humanity’s increasing ability to alter and, 
even, create plant life.  In 1930, Congress passed the Plant 
Patent Act (PPA), which allows for patents on newly-discovered 
or -invented, distinct, asexually-reproduced plants.33 Congress 
later passed the Plant Variety Protection Act of 1970 (PVPA) 
which extends patent protection to those who develop new 
varieties of sexually-reproduced plants.34  No specific legislation 
has yet been passed regarding patent protection for the 
 
 26. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Act of April 10, 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109 (1790). 
 29. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103. 
 30. See id. at § 101 (“Inventions patentable: Whoever invents or discovers 
any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, 
or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, 
subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.”). 
 31. See id. at § 102  (“A person shall be entitled to a patent unless–(a)  the 
invention was known or used by others in this country, or patented or 
described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country, before the 
invention thereof by the applicant for patent . . . .”). 
 32. See id. at § 103 (explaining that a patent shall be granted “if the 
differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art 
are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the 
time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to 
which said subject matter pertains.”). 
 33. Plant Patent Act, Pub. L. No. 71-245, 46 Stat. 376 (1930) (current 
version at 35 U.S.C. § 161) (1988). 
 34. Plant Variety Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 91-577, 84 Stat. 1542 (1970) 
(current version at 7 U.S.C. §§ 2321-2582 (1994 & Supp II 1996)). 
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manufacture of animals, either through genetic engineering or 
through selective breeding.35 
The courts and the PTO have—after lengthy debate36—
determined that the patent statute allows for the patenting of 
animals, thus opening the floodgates to animal patents.  In 
1980, the Supreme Court held in Diamond v. Chakrabarty that 
“a live, human-made micro-organism is patentable subject 
matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.”37  In re Merat marked the 
United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals’ (C.C.P.A.) 
first rejection of a claim to patent a living organism, in this 
case a dwarf chicken.38  The PTO rejected the application for 
the chicken because, the Court ruled, it was not a 
“manufacture” but the product of selective breeding.39  The 
C.C.P.A., however, granted a patent for a micro-organism used 
to produce an antibiotic in In re Bergy.40 
The seminal Chakrabarty case involved Ananda M. 
Chakrabarty’s application to patent a “human-made, 
genetically engineered bacterium . . . capable of breaking down 
multiple components of crude oil.”41  Chakrabarty wanted to 
obtain patents on three discoveries: (1) the method of producing 
the bacterium,42 (2) “an inoculum comprised of a carrier 
material floating on water, such as straw, and the new 
bacteria,”43 and (3) “the bacteria themselves.”44  The patent 
examiner accepted the first two but rejected the claim to the 
bacteria themselves, reasoning that the micro-organisms were 
“products of nature” and that living matter is not patentable 
under 35 U.S.C. § 101.45  The Patent Office Board of Appeals 
affirmed on the second rationale–that living matter is not 
 
 35. See infra text accompanying notes 183-217 for a discussion of the 
legislation that has been proposed. 
 36. See infra text accompanying notes 36-72. 
 37. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 305 (1980). 
 38. 519 F.2d 1390, 186 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 471 (C.C.P.A. 1975). 
 39. See id.  Ultimately, the C.C.P.A. rejected the patent as “not 
particularly point[ing] out or distinctly claim[ing] the subject matter of 
appellants’ invention.”  Id. at 1396. 
 40. 596 F.2d 952 (C.C.P.A. 1979), cert. dismissed, 444 U.S. 1028 (1980), 
aff’d 447 U.S. 303 (1980). 
 41. Chakrabarty, “a microbiologist, filed a patent application, assigned to 
the General Electric Co.” 447 U.S. at 305. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. at 305-06. 
 44. Id. 
 45. See id. at 306. 
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patentable.46  However, relying on its rationale in In re Bergy, 
the C.C.P.A. reversed.47  After a remand48 and a reaffirmation,49 
the Supreme Court granted certiorari50 and affirmed,51 giving 
Chakrabarty his patent not only on the processes and corollary 
products but on the micro-organisms, themselves. 
The Court in Chakrabarty identified its task as “one of 
statutory interpretation.”52  It was to consider the “narrow” 
question of  “whether [Chakrabarty’s] micro-organism 
constitutes a ‘manufacture’ or ‘composition of matter’ within 
the meaning of [35 U.S.C. § 101].”53 
Despite significant concerns expressed by the amicus briefs 
and expressly noted in the Court’s decision, the Court 
specifically rejected the challenge of addressing these concerns 
in issuing its ruling.54  The amicus briefs, which included the 
statements of “[s]cientists, among them Nobel laureates,”55  
“point[] to a parade of horribles,” including “that genetic 
research may pose a serious threat to the human race, . . . 
spread pollution and disease, . . . [and] result in a loss of 
genetic diversity.”56  The Court specifically deemed such 
concerns outside the scope of its review.57  Chief Justice Burger 
wrote, “[i]t is argued that this Court should weigh these 
potential hazards in considering whether respondent’s 
invention is patentable subject matter under § 101.  We 
 
 46. See id. 
 47. In In re Bergy, the court stated, “[i]n short, we think the fact that 
microorganisms . . . are alive is a distinction without legal significance and 
that disposes of the board’s ground of rejection and the sole reason for refusal 
of a patent argued by the solicitor.”  In re Bergy 563 F.2d. 1031, 1038 (C.C.P.A. 
1977). 
 48. See Parker v. Bergy, 438 U.S. 902 (1978). 
 49. See Application of Bergy, 596 F.2d 952 (C.C.P.A. 1979). 
 50. See Parker v. Bergy, 444 U.S. 924 (1979). 
 51. See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980) (holding that the 
language of 35 U.S.C. § 101 “embraces [Chakrabarty’s] invention”). 
 52. Id. at 307. 
 53. Id. 35 U.S.C. § 101 states that, “[w]hoever invents or discovers any 
new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or 
any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, 
subject to the conditions and requirements of this title” [emphasis added]. 
 54. See Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 316-17.  The Court reasoned that their 
decision would “not deter the scientific mind from probing” and, therefore, not 
affect whether research continued and that the Court was “without 
competence to entertain these arguments.”  Id. 
 55. Id. at 316. 
 56. Id. 
 57. See id. at 316-17. 
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disagree.”58  Thus the courts have not examined whether 
transgenic animals ought to be patentable but only whether 
they are patentable. 
The Chakrabarty decision was relied on shortly thereafter 
to grant a patent to non-naturally occurring man-made 
multicellular plants59 and then to support the grant of a patent 
to a genetically altered strain of oysters.60  Four days after the 
oyster case was decided, the Patent and Trademark Office 
(“PTO”) issued a statement in the Official Gazette stating, 
The Patent and Trademark Office now considers nonnaturally occurring 
non-human multicellular organisms, including animals, to be patentable 
subject matter within the scope of 35 U.S.C. s. 101. 
The Board’s decision does not affect the principle and practice that 
products found in nature will not be considered to be patentable subject 
matter under 35 U.S.C. 101 and/or 102.  An article of manufacture or 
composition of matter occurring in nature will not be considered 
patentable unless given a new form, quality, properties or combination 
not present in the original article. . . . 61 
The statement expressly excludes “human being[s]” from 
the description of patentable subject matter.62  The first animal 
patent, the patent for the famous Harvard Onco-mouse, was 
published one year later.63  The PTO has, since breaking this 
barrier, granted many transgenic animal patents.64  In an effort 
to halt the grant of animal patents, several groups joined to file 
suit challenging the PTO’s procedure in making these 
decisions.65  Their suit was dismissed for lack of standing.66  The 
 
 58. Id. 
 59. Ex parte Hibberd, 227 U.S.P.Q. 443 (Bd. Pat. App. & Int. 1985) (ruling 
that the principles of Chakrabarty could be extended to allow the patenting of 
genetically-engineered plants, seeds, and plant tissue). 
 60. Ex parte Allen, 2 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1425 (Bd. Pat. App. & Int. 1987) 
(denying the patent request on the alternative basis of “obviousness” but 
affirming a broad reading of the patentability of living organisms, generally), 
aff’d 846 F.2d 77 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 
 61. See PTO Notice, supra note 4. 
 62. Evidently, the PTO recognized and, therefore, noted that “[t]he grant 
of a limited, but exclusive property right in a human being is prohibited by the 
Constitution.” Id.  See also Magnani, supra note 1, at 448 (noting that the PTO 
appears implicitly to have been referring to the 13th Amendment). 
 63. U.S. Patent No. 4,736,866. 
 64. See supra note 10. 
 65. See Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Quigg 932 F.2d. 920 (Fed. Cir. 
1991).  The Animal Legal Defense Fund, et al.. argued that the PTO violated 
section 553 of the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. § 553 (2000)) by 
failing to provide notice and an opportunity for comments.  See id.  Moreover 
they contend that the PTO violated Section 706(c) (2)  of the APA (5 U.S.C.  
§ 706 (2000)) by acting in excess of statutory jurisdiction.  See id. 
 66. Id. 
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grant of patents for genetically engineered plants and animals 
has proceeded steadily since.67 
The Chakrabarty decision, subsequent PTO ruling, and 
consequent grants of patents for genetically-altered plants and 
animals have generated considerable controversy.  The 
Chakrabarty Court was divided 5-4.68  That division reflects a 
similarly-divided society.69  Indeed, responding to such concern, 
two giant international food producers, the fast-food restaurant 
chain McDonalds and the snack food manufacturer Frito-Lay, 
have asked their suppliers not to supply them with potatoes 
grown from genetically-modified seed.70  In his Chakrabarty 
dissent, Justice Brennan noted that in the PPA and PVPA, 
“Congress had addressed the general problem of patenting 
animate inventions and has chosen carefully limited language 
granting protection to some kinds of discoveries, but specifically 
excluding others.”71  He stated that if Congress had considered 
plants and other “living organisms” patentable under 35 U.S.C. 
§ 101, it would not have passed the PPA and PVPA.72  Justice 
Brennan cautioned that the PTO’s decision to patent living 
organisms “uniquely implicates matters of public concern.”73 
 
A. CLARIFYING THE PARAMETERS OF THE CURRENT LAW 
 
The PTO’s announcement that living matter is patentable 
has led to several calls for clarification and modification.  One 
author notes that, “[b]ecause of the requirement that the 
animal be ‘nonnaturally occurring,’ the consensus is that a 
patent would not be awarded to a particular breed of a species 
that was improved by classical breeding techniques,” thus 
 
 67. See supra note 10. 
 68. 447 U.S. at 304. 
 69. See infra Part II.A, SHOULD TRANSGENIC ANIMALS BE PATENTED on 
the concerns of farmers, animal rights activists, the international community, 
and on legislation to regulate patenting of transgenic animals offered by over 
twenty-one different members of Congress.  See supra text accompanying 
notes 5-7, 11-15.  Also the fact that 48 Members of Congress recently called for 
labeling of genetically-modified food demonstrates considerable public concern 
over such products.  See also Hotakainen, supra note 13 (stating that eighty-
one percent of Americans support labeling genetically altered food, which 
implies, at least, a desire to know whether their food has been genetically 
altered). 
 70. World News Tonight (ABC television broadcast, Apr. 28, 2000). 
 71. 447 U.S. at 319 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 72. See id. at 320. 
 73. Id. at 322. 
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limiting patentability to genetically-engineered animals.74 
While he interrogates what “nonnaturally occurring” might 
mean, others have wondered about the April 1987 PTO 
statement’s use of the term “non-human.”75  Specifically, 
Jeremy Rifkin and Dr. Stuart Newman have asked whether 
“non-human” would apply to human-animal chimeras.76  This 
debate has been stoked by the December 1997 patent 
application of Rifkin, an opponent of biotechnology, and 
Newman, a cellular biologist at New York Medical College.77  
The Rifkin-Newman patent application “covers the production 
of human-animal chimeras that could be up to 50% human.”78  
The purpose of the Rifkin-Newman patent application is to 
obstruct the patenting of human-animal chimeras either by 
receiving the patent, thereby preventing others from receiving 
such a patent and using it, or by raising enough public debate 
to effect a statutory restriction on the practice.79  This 
development was anticipated shortly after the PTO’s policy 
statement.80 
In addition to the moral and theological concerns regarding 
the ontological status of human-animal chimeras, a more subtle 
concern has attracted the attention of some: the devaluation of 
human life that would attend the patenting of a creature with 
even a few human genes.  Professor Dresser summarizes 
animal-patenting opponents’ three most significant concerns 
about a process of creating non-human animals with human 
genes.81  First, she notes a concern with  “endanger[ing] the 
special value society gives to human life.”82  Second, she 
reiterates the view that such processes would “cast[] doubt on 
our basic assumptions about the unique character of the 
human species,” including problematizing the cultural taboo 
 
 74. Paul Blunt, Note, Selective Breeding and the Patenting of Living 
Organisms, 48 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1365, 1370 (1998). 
 75. See id. 
 76. A “chimera” is “[a]n organism, esp. a plant, with tissues from at least 
two genetically distinct parents.”  WEBSTERS II NEW RIVERSIDE DICTIONARY 
256 (1988).  This definition’s emphasis on plant chimeras indicates that 
biotechnology advances are changing the word, itself. 
 77. See generally Magnani, supra note 1. 
 78. Id. at 443. 
 79. See id. 
 80. See Dresser, supra note 1, at 415-17. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. at 415. 
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against human/animal procreation,83 and finally, she asks 
about  “the moral and legal status we would confer on such 
hybrids.”84  Dresser concludes that “the real questions involve 
the appropriate regulatory actions to take to avoid 
unacceptable intrusions on respect for life and other important 
human values.”85 
Blunt finds the argument that animal patenting will lead 
to the devaluation of human life an “unsubstantiated 
hypothesis” based on a “questionable psychological 
assumption.”86  James Chiapetta counters concerns such as 
Dresser’s by arguing that “the rationale and incentive for 
biotechnological innovation has been recognition of the value of 
human life,” as biotechnology eases human suffering.87  It is not 
entirely clear that opponents in this debate are addressing each 
others’ concerns.88  Many are simply calling for a public 
discussion and, if then deemed necessary, legislation.89 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 83. Id. at 415-416. 
 84. Id. at 416. 
 85. Id. at 417. 
 86. Blunt, supra note 74, at 1379. 
 87. James R. Chiapetta D.V.M., Comment, Of Mice and Machine: A 
Paradigmatic Challenge to Interpretation of the Patent Statute, 20 WM. 
MITCHELL L. REV. 155, 181-82 (1994). 
 88. Blunt does not identify the “questionable psychological assumptions” 
nor what is questionable about them.  See Blunt, supra note 74.  Chiapetta is 
content to posit the non-sequitur that because biotechnology often eases 
human suffering, a devaluation of human life would not result from genetic 
engineering that placed human genes in non-human animals.  See Chiapetta, 
supra note 87. 
 89. See, e.g., Magnani, supra note 1, at 460; Dresser, supra note 1, at 434-
35; David Manspeizer, The Cheshire Cat, The March Hare, and the Harvard 
Mouse: Animal Patents Open up a New Genetically-Engineered Wonderland, 
43 RUTGERS L. REV. 417, 419 (1991); Michael E. Sellers, Case Note, Patenting 
Nonnaturally Occurring, Man-Made Life: A Practical Look at the Economic, 
Environmental, and Ethical Challenges Facing “Animal Patents,” 47 ARK. L. 
REV. 269, 295 (1994); Carrie F. Walter, Note, Beyond the Harvard Mouse: 
Current Patent Practice and the Necessity of Clear Guidelines in Biotechnology 
Patent Law, 73 IND. L. J. 1025, 1049 (1998); Elizabeth Joy Hecht, Note, 
Beyond Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Quigg: The Controversy Over 
Transgenic Animal Patents Continues, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 1023, 1048-50, 1074 
(1992). 
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B. INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION OF PATENT RIGHTS IN 
 TRANSGENIC LIFE 
 
While laws might be restricted to discrete jurisdictions, 
science is not.  Thus, one area of interest is the coincidence, or 
lack thereof, between U.S. law and law in other countries.  
Dresser pointed out in 1988 that “Bulgaria, Hungary, and 
Romania are the only other countries that currently provide 
some level of patent protection on animal ‘inventions.’”90  
Magnani points out that the European Community has 
prohibited “the patenting of ethically questionable practices.”91  
This fact is testified to by the fact that “. . . the European 
Parliament . . . voted to revoke a patent to Harvard University 
for a transgenic mouse, pending further examination of the 
ethical issues surrounding the patenting of animals.”92  
However, while the European Patent Convention seems 
unambiguous in denying patent rights to new plants and 
animals, in January of 2000 the European Patent Office lifted 
its moratorium on applications for such patents.93  Thus, all of 
the European Union now offers patent protection for transgenic 
plants and animals.  Nevertheless, as Former Senator Hatfield 
notes, according to the U.S. Office of Technology Assessment,  
“[t]he United States is virtually alone in the industrialized 
world in not having a commission to examine bioethics 
issues.”94 
 
 90. Dresser, supra note 1, at 399, n.1.  Dresser also explains that there is 
no such patent protection for transgenic life forms in Japan, Australia, and 
“several other countries,” while the status of such patents in thirteen 
European countries (governed by the European Patent Convention) “has not 
been definitively established.”  The European Community once prohibited 
issuing patents for transgenic plants and animals under Article 53(b) of the 
European Patent Convention.  Denise M. Kettelberger, Biotech Patents Face 
Critical Decision in Europe (visited Jan. 15, 2000) 
<http://www.ljx.com/patents/p11biotech.html>.  It later reversed that 
interpretation of that article of the European Patent Convention.  See infra 
text accompanying note 93. 
 91. Magnani, supra note 1, at 443. 
 92. Animal Patent Moratorium Bill Reintroduced, 5 NO. 5 J. 
PROPRIETARY RTS. 25 (1993). 
 93. European Patent Convention Art. 53 states that “European patents 
shall not be granted in respect of . . . plant or animal varieties or essentially 
biological processes for the production of plants or animals.”  European Patent 
Convention Art. 53.  See Quirin Schiermeier and David Dickinson, Europe 
Lifts Patent Embargo on Transgenic Plants and Animals, 403 NATURE 3 (Jan. 
20, 2000) <http://www.biotech-info.net/europe_lifts.html>. 
 94. Sen. Mark O. Hatfield, From Microbe to Man, 1 ANIMAL L. 5, 7 (1995). 
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C. ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF TRANSGENIC ANIMAL PATENTS 
 
Trade and economics are deeply implicated by the 
patenting of transgenic life forms, both plants and animals.  
Michael Sellers explains that “[a]lthough the United States is 
still the leader in the commercial exploitation of biotechnology, 
proponents fear this lead could be lost without a system to 
support the patenting of genetically engineered animals.”95  He 
expresses concern that the United States could lose its 
economic advantage in biotechnology to either Europe or to 
Japan.96  On the other side of the economic coin, Elisabeth T. 
Jozwiak argues that the problems “lesser-developed countries” 
face with disease and starvation could be reduced if they had a 
better system of patent protection for transgenic animals.97  She 
asserts that the United States should form bilateral 
agreements with such countries to promote the patent 
protection currently enjoyed in the U.S.98  The rub is protecting 
economic interests afforded by patent protection while 
promoting the common good of which biotechnology might be 
capable.99 
 
D. PROTECTION FOR FARMERS: FARMERS’ EXEMPTION 
 
Another oft-expressed concern is that large agribusinesses 
will own the patents to the most sought-after transgenic plants 
and animals, thus allowing them to freeze out the small family 
farm.100  One possible solution to this problem is a “Farmers’ 
Exemption.”  As a possible solution to the negative effects of 
such patent monopolies, The Transgenic Animal Patent Reform 
Act101 stated, inter alia, that “[i]t shall not be an act of 
 
 95. Sellers, supra note 89, at 286. 
 96. See id. 
 97. See Elisabeth T. Jozwiak, Comment, Worms, Mice, Cows and Pigs: The 
Importance of Animal Patents in Developing Countries 14 NW. J. INT’L L. & 
BUS. 620 (1994). 
 98. See id. at 640-41. 
 99. See generally David G. Scalise and Daniel Nugent, International 
Intellectual Property Protections for Living Matter: Biotechnology, 
Multinational Conventions and the Exception for Agriculture, 27 CASE W. RES. 
J. INT’L L. 83, 86 (1995) (advancing “alternatives for achieving an 
international sharing of technology while avoiding the deleterious effects upon 
the biotechnology industry of globally recognized farmers’ privilege”). 
 100. See infra text accompanying notes 201-202. 
 101. H.R. 4970, 100th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1988). 
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infringement for a person whose occupation is farming to 
reproduce a patented transgenic farm animal through 
breeding, use such animal in the farming operation, or sell such 
animal or the offspring of such animal.”102  The hearings that 
produced the proposed Act also considered narrow exceptions to 
patent protection focused on the family farm, prohibiting 
animal patents entirely, and setting royalty rates based on the 
number of generations a purchaser wished to purchase.103  Such 
an exemption could parallel the Farmers’ Exemption for plant 
patents which exists in the PVPA.104 
Making an argument for protection along the lines of a 
“Farmers’ Exemption” in Animal Legal Defense Fund. v. Quigg 
were farmers and farming organizations, who were among the 
many plaintiffs.105  These farmers “assert[ed] economic injury 
from the [PTO] Commissioner’s allegedly erroneous 
interpretation of [35 U.S.C.] section 101.”106  The court rejected 
this allegation, denying the farmers standing.  The court stated 
that “the alleged economic injuries of individual farmers and 
farm organizations are not ‘fairly traceable’ to the allegedly 
erroneous interpretation of the statute by the Commissioner.”107  
There is, however, considerable debate about whether a 
“Farmers’ Exception” would on the one hand effectively 
eliminate the incentive to research such transgenic life forms,108 
or would, on the other hand, “only minimally reduce[] the 
incentive effect of patent protection.”109  Still others argue that 
not all farmers object to issuing animal patents, and some even 
opposed the Transgenic Animal Patent Reform Act because of 
its Farmers’ Exemption.110 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 102. Id. 
 103. See Sellers, supra note 89, at 287-88 (1994). 
 104. 7 U.S.C. § 2543 (1982). 
 105. See Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Quigg, 932 F.2d 920, 931-32 (Fed. 
Cir. 1991). 
 106. Id. at 931. 
 107. Id. at 936.  See Hecht, supra note 89, at 1048-49. 
 108. See Dresser, supra note 1, at 433. 
 109. Manspeizer, supra note 89, at 451. 
 110. See Walter, supra note 89, at 1041-42. 
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II. ANALYSIS 
 
Like the man in the joke who, although lost and unsure 
where he is heading, insists that he is making good time, 
scientists continue to engineer transgenic animals, and the 
PTO routinely offers patents on these transgenic animals.  
Because of the competing interests of the corporations that 
benefit financially from patents on these animals, the public, 
which might be affected negatively by unintended 
consequences, and those who advocate on behalf of the animal 
populations themselves, Congress should step forward and 
direct the PTO which is currently granting animal patents in 
an ad hoc manner. 
 
A. SHOULD TRANSGENIC ANIMALS BE PATENTED? 
 
1. The Rights of the Animals 
 
Other concerns emerged in calls for a more carefully-
studied approach to the rights of the animals that might be 
affected.111  Among the concerns more commonly expressed are 
that genetically-engineered animals could damage or destroy 
native species by over population, over consumption, habitat 
destruction, or simply interbreeding so that no “natural” 
examples of a species remain.112  Others are concerned that 
animal patenting will cause increased animal suffering.113  
Among the plaintiffs in Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Quigg 
were not only farm organizations, but also groups concerned 
with animal rights, per se.114  The 9th Circuit dismissed the suit 
for lack of standing.  Invoking a newly-entertained legal theory, 
some have also questioned whether humans’ property rights 
over animals are such that they allow humans to alter animals’ 
genetic structures.115 
 
 111. See Dresser, supra note 1, at 422-24. 
 112. See infra text accompanying notes 142-162. 
 113. See Chiapetta, supra note 87, at 182-84; infra text accompanying 
notes 120-139.  But see Manspeizer, supra note 89, at 441 (dismissing such 
concerns as having no “factual basis”). 
 114. Other plaintiffs included the American Society for the Prevention of 
Cruelty to Animals, The Marin Humane Society, the Association of 
Veterinarians for Animal Rights, People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, 
farm organizations, and individual farmers.  See Animal Legal Defense Fund 
v. Quigg, 932 f.2d 920, 931-32 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 
 115. See infra text accompanying notes 116-140. 
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2. Should Animals Be Patentable “Things”? 
 
The status of animals as mere property has become an 
increasingly common subject of debate in the legal world.116  
The legal community tends to think of property rights as legal 
relations between people and things.117  Thus, several people 
and entities might have a property interest in a particular 
parcel of real property.118  While the common law tradition 
considers animals as property in just the same way as other 
objects, contemporary statutory law has changed our 
relationship to animals as objects of property in many 
meaningful ways.119  Every state now has a statute 
criminalizing cruelty to animals.120  These statutes vary 
considerably, some considering animal cruelty a felony while 
some consider it a misdemeanor, and all but three containing 
one or more exemptions (typically for farming, research, and 
veterinary practices).121  Nevertheless, each of these statutes 
limits property rights in animals by limiting the range of  
dominion people have over animals.122 
In addition to these pervasive state statues, are several 
federal statutes, of which “the Animal Welfare Act is the 
broadest.”123  The Animal Welfare Act of 1970124 affects how 
 
 116. See, e.g., GARY L. FRANCIONE, ANIMALS, PROPERTY, AND THE LAW 
(1995); STEVEN M. WISE, RATTLING THE CAGE: TOWARD LEGAL RIGHTS FOR 
ANIMALS (2000); Gary L. Francione, Animals as Property, 2 ANIMAL L. 1 
(1996); Thomas G. Kelch, Toward a Non Property Status for Animals, 6 N.Y.U. 
ENVTL. L. J. 531 (1998); Steven M. Wise, How Non-human Animals Were 
Trapped in a Nonexistent Universe, 1 ANIMAL L. 15 (1995); Steven M. Wise, 
The Legal Thinghood of Non-Human Animals, 23 ENVTL AFF. 471 (1996). 
 117. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1216 (6th ed. 1990) (defining “property” 
as “[i]n the strict legal sense, an aggregate of rights which are guaranteed and 
protected by the government”). 
 118. One person might, for example, own a present possessory interest 
while another owns a future interest while yet another might possess a very 
limited property interest in the same land in the form of an easement or other 
servitude. 
 119. See Kelch, supra note 116, at 533-40 (discussing the historical 
common law definition of animals as property). 
 120. See Pamela D. Frasch et al., State Animal Anti-Cruelty Statutes: An 
Overview, 5 ANIMAL L. 69 (1999). 
 121. See id. 
 122. See id. (surveying the provisions of all fifty states’ animal cruelty 
statutes). 
 123. See Kelch, supra note 116, at 542. 
 124. 7 U.S.C. §§ 2131-59 (1994) (requiring the “humane treatment” of 
animals in a wide variety of circumstances implicating interstate commerce). 
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people can legally treat a wide range of animals.  The Humane 
Methods of Slaughter Act of 1978125 and the Twenty Eight Hour 
Law126 limit the property rights farmers have in their livestock.  
Other federal statutes limit the property rights people have vis-
à-vis various types of animals.  For example, the Antarctic 
Science, Tourism, and Conservation Act of 1996,127 the Bald and 
Golden Eagle Protection Act,128 the Endangered Species Act of 
1973,129 the Fur Seal Act of 1966,130 and the Marine Mammal 
Protection Act of 1972131 all limit peoples’ property interest in 
wild animals.132  Implicit in this lengthy list of statutes is a 
pervasive, on-going belief that humans’ dominion over animals 
has limits, that we do not consider ourselves free to subject 
animals to cruelties and other forms of abuse simply as we 
wish.  These myriad statutes imply something of a consensus, 
in fact, less of a dominion over animals than of a stewardship 
over them, a stewardship that we appear regularly to interpret 
as requiring that we protect animals from abuse and extinction. 
Even research facilities, so often held separate because of 
their medical activities, now must maintain at least one 
“institutional animal care and use committee” (“IACUC”).133  
These state and federal statutes affect our relationships to pets, 
 
 125. 7 U.S.C. §§ 1901-06 (1994) (stating that “the slaughtering of livestock 
and the handling of livestock in connection with slaughter shall be carried out 
only by humane methods”). 
 126. 46 U.S.C. §§ 3901-02 (1994) (“prescrib[ing] standards for space, 
ventilation, fittings, food and water supply, and other requirements the 
Secretary of Agriculture considers necessary for the safe and proper 
transportation and humane treatment of . . . animals”). 
 127. 16 U.S.C. §§ 2401-13 (1994). 
 128. 16 U.S.C. § 668 (1994). 
 129. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-44 (1994). 
 130. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1151-75 (1994). 
 131. 16 U.S.C. § 1361 (1982). 
 132. See Kelch, supra note 116, at 543-79 (citing these laws and arguing 
that the status of animals as property should be changed via the common law).  
See also Appellants’ Opening Brief at 29-30, Animal Legal Defense Fund 
(“ALDF”) 932 F.2d at 920 (No. 90-1364) (citing many of these state and federal 
statutes and arguing that such statutes establish that animals are not 
“things”).  ALDF thus argued that the PTO’s interpretation of Congress’ 
saying that the patent statutes allow for patenting “anything under the sun 
made by man” should not include animals. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 303 
(1980).  The court did not address this argument as the case was not decided 
on the merits.  See ALDF, 932 F.2d at 939 (holding that ALDF did not have 
standing to challenge the PTO’s ruling in 1077 Official Gazette U.S. Pat. & 
Trademark Off. 24 (Apr. 21, 1987)). 
 133. Language requiring IACUCs was amended onto the Animal Welfare 
Act in 1985.  See 7 U.S.C. § 2143. 
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farm animals, wild animals, and research animals as property.  
They, to a greater or lesser degree, affect the limits of our 
property rights in animals, problematizing a world view in 
which animals are thought of as property in just the same way 
as inanimate objects are.  In the language of Professor 
Francione, these statutes identify animals’ “non-tradable 
interests,” that is, interests that are not subject to possession 
by others.134  Several lawyers have successfully challenged 
assumed property rights in animals, arguing that contrary to 
being property subject to fee simple possession by others, 
animals retain rights independent of their owners’.135 
Furthermore, there is reason for concern over how much 
transgenic research animals might suffer.  Some of these 
animals are created to suffer.136  Others suffer as a result of 
unanticipated consequences.137  The Animal Welfare Act 
(“AWA”), which was passed to protect, inter alia, research 
animals, allows tremendous abuses of such animals to occur.138  
Animals created to suffer for the entertainment purposes of 
people, animals created for the purpose of their freakish 
appearance or their size (big or small) or their unusual 
abilities, could forseeably endure lifetimes of suffering with no 
real protection.139  These concerns are unique to beings that feel 
 
 134. See Francione, Animals as Property, supra note 116, at v (arguing that 
these statutes do not recognize enough non-tradable interests in animals). 
 135. See, e.g., William Glaberson, Legal Pioneers Seek to Raise the Lowly 
Status of Animals, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18, 1999, at A1 (citing several recent 
victories in protecting the limited property status of animals). 
 136. See supra note 63.  The Harvard Mouse, for example, was designed to 
be susceptible to and, presumably, die of, cancer. This intentional design 
raises the question of whether humans have the right to create an animal 
specifically to die of a painful disease. 
 137. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 19. 
 138. See Francione, ANIMALS, PROPERTY, AND THE LAW supra note 116, at 
211.  Professor Francione explains the reason that the AWA is an ineffective 
tool for relieving animal suffering at the hands of researchers: 
Before being assigned enforcement of the AWA, the USDA dealt 
primarily with the production, treatment, and slaughter of food animals.  
USDA has never enjoyed a reputation as an organization interested in 
the humane treatment of animals as a general matter.  Indeed, in one 
case, a court struck down a USDA regulation, holding that the 
regulation ‘does not reflect the views of an agency which gave serious 
consideration to the prevention of cruelty to animals.’  In another case, a 
court held that the USDA declined ‘to consider the benefit to animals as 
worthy of serious consideration as it decides how best to carry out its 
mandate’ [footnotes omitted].   
Id. 
 139. Pamela D. Frasch et al., supra note 120, at 69.  The only protection 
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pain, and, therefore, concerns that transgenic animals, as 
opposed to transgenic plants, generate. 
Under the contemporary legal paradigm of assumed 
stewardship over the natural world, and over animals in 
particular, regulation preserving the natural animal gene pool 
seems both reasonable and prudent.  As the animal cruelty and 
other animal-protection statutes exemplify, there has always 
been a place in American law for doing not only what is 
practical but also for doing what is good.140  Engaging in 
cautious circumspection before extending our dominion over 
animals to the point of altering their genetic code, even if for 
the purpose of  “improving” them, is a just such a case when it 
would behoove us to consider not only what is possible, even 
practical, but also what is good. 
 
3. Are Transgenic Animals Safe? 
 
In addition to the questions raised by the potential abuse 
of transgenic animals, a second category of concern surrounds 
the questions about whether transgenic animals are safe for 
people and the natural environment.  Cautionary tales about 
the dangers of altering the natural universe permeate the 
Western mythos.  Some of these stories tell of human hubris 
while others relate the unintended results of carelessness.  
Ranging from classical mythology (Dedalus and Pygmalion), to 
Romantic nineteenth century literature (Frankenstein), to 
popular cinema (Godzilla), cautionary tales regarding the 
dangers of altering the natural universe are a persistent 
subgenre in the Western tradition.  Whether they are 
grounded, then, in our primordial fears or in rational grasp of 
metaphysics and science, concerns about genetic engineering 
abound. 
 
 
animal property has against abuse are state animal cruelty statutes.  These 
statutes are famously under-enforced.  Professor Pamela Frasch explains that 
. . . some prosecutors are less likely to charge or prosecute animal 
cruelty compared to other violent crimes, except in the most extreme 
cases. This apparent reluctance to prosecute stems from many factors, 
including: real or perceived limited resources; inexperienced staff; 
incomplete or botched investigations; pressure from the community to 
focus on other crimes; and personal or political bias against taking 
animal abuse seriously as a violent crime.   
Id. 
 140. See, e.g., Frasch et al., supra note 120. 
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Many of these concerns arise out of the agricultural 
community.  While, it has been argued that some people merely 
fear the loss of the traditional family farm out of some idealistic 
or Luddite sensibility,141 some fears are based squarely in 
science or economics.  Some worry whether transgenic animals 
could pollute natural gene pools, biodiversity, and 
ecosystems.142  Elisabeth Jozwiak asserts that such transgenic 
animals could not survive in the wild “since the transgenic 
animals that are produced in the laboratory are acclimated to 
the sterile laboratory environment.”143  Jozwiak, however, 
merely supports this assertion by reference to the gene 
transference procedure as described by David Manspeizer.144  
However, while the gene insertion is a laboratory process, the 
“cattle, pigs, sheep, fish, goats, and fowl” thus created145 do not 
live in sterile laboratories.  They live outdoors subject to the 
vicissitudes of weather, fence-wrecking accidents, sabotage, 
theft, and other phenomena which threaten the security of 
farm animals.  And, while some proposed legislation would 
proscribe the release of genetically-altered animals into the 
wild,146 legislative consensus means little to a “geep.”147 
Non-native species of plant and animal regularly invade 
environments causing great harm.  Manspeizer cites the 
example of the gypsy moth which, artificially introduced to the 
United States, has “defoliated an estimated ten million 
acres.”148  Professor Dresser cites the damage caused by 
introducing the non-native kudzu vine into the United States 
as another example of the harm that can be caused by the 
release of non-native species into the wild.149  The gypsy moth 
 
 141. Professor Jim Chen critiques opposition to developments of technology 
and scale in agribusiness as rooted in “bucolic illusions” arising from “Little Bo 
Peep” and “Little House on the Prairie.”  Jim Chen, The Agroecological Opium 
of the Masses, CHOICES, Fourth Quarter 1995, at 19, 21. 
 142. See, e.g., Kimbrell, supra note 19, at 138-39; Dresser, supra note 1, at 
412; 138 CONG. REC. E1118 (daily ed. Apr. 28, 1992) (statement of Rep. 
Cardin); Muir & Howard, infra note 155. 
 143. Jozwiak, supra note 97, at 630. 
 144. See id. at 621. 
 145. See Manspeizer, supra note 89, at 424. 
 146. See, e.g.,  S. 1291, 102nd Cong. § 105(a)(2) (1991); H.R. 4989, 102nd 
Cong. § 105(a)(2) (1991) (forbidding “the entering of genetically engineered 
animals into the open environment beyond appropriately confined research or 
commercial settings”). 
 147. See Dresser, supra note 1. 
 148. Manspeizer, supra note 89, at 432. 
 149. See Dresser, supra note 1, at 411-12.  The non-native kudzu vine has 
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and kudzu vine were non-native species that were intentionally 
introduced into the U.S. ecosystem, and they, nevertheless, 
have caused great damage.  What damage might be caused by 
species that are not only “non-native” but also “non-natural” 
and which might be introduced into the wild unintentionally 
and without controls?  Zebra mussels were unintentionally 
introduced into American lakes in the 1980s.150  In less than 
twenty years, they have significantly changed the ecology of 
some American lakes and rivers, threatening several species of 
native animals.151  In addition to consuming food resources 
native fish and mussel species require and depleting oxygen 
levels in the waters they inhabit, these accidentally-introduced 
mussels also clog power station pipes and damage boats.152 
Several articles have recently expressed concern over 
transgenic salmon escaping into the wild and, possibly, 
endangering native populations through over-consumption or 
over population.153  Such salmon are typically raised in “net 
pens” in the sea, which are often rent by waves or predators, 
allowing thousands of fish to escape.154  Evidence of the dangers 
escaped transgenic animals could cause to the environment was 
recently supplied by two Purdue University scientists who 
modeled the release of transgenic fish into a wild environment 
and concluded that “introduction of genetically modified 
organisms into natural populations could result in ecological 
hazards, such as species extinction.”155  Professors Muir and 
Howard inserted human growth hormone genes into medaka (a 
type of small fish) to study “the ecological consequences of 
transgene release into natural populations.”156  Specifically, 
they noted “increased male mating success but reduced 
 
wreaked havoc throughout the Southeastern U. S., growing uncontrollably and 
devastating crops, since it was introduced to control soil erosion. 
 150. See Tom Meersman, Zebra-Mussel Threat Grows in St. Croix, 
MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIBUNE, Aug. 24, 2000, at A1. 
 151. See id. 
 152. See id. 
 153. See Carol Kaesuk Yoon, Altered Salmon Lead the Way to the Dinner 
Plate, but Rules Lag, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 2000, at A1.  See also Sharon 
Schmickle, Professor Acknowledges Worries About Genetically Altered Fish, 
MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIBUNE (Minneapolis), July 24, 2000, at B1. 
 154. See Yoon, supra note 144, at A20. 
 155. William M. Muir & Richard D. Howard, Possible ecological risks of 
transgenic organism release when transgenes affect mating success: Sexual 
selection and the Trojan gene hypothesis, 96 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 13853, 
13853 (2000). 
 156. Id. 
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offspring viability.”157  They discovered that the transgenic fish 
had a four-fold mating advantage158 which spread the transgene 
in a manner which could be disastrous for the native species: 
“[w]e refer to this type of extinction as the ‘Trojan gene effect,’ 
because the mating advantage provides a mechanism for the 
transgene to enter and spread in a population, and the viability 
reduction [of the offspring] eventually results in population 
extinction.”159 
One proponent of genetically-modified organisms criticizes 
assertions regarding the potential environmental threats of 
genetically-engineered animals.160  He states, 
Jeremy Rifkin compares the risks of biotechnology with those of the 
petrochemical industry and concludes that the risks from rDNA 
technology are greater. . . . It is hard to understand how Mr. Rifkin can 
make this assertion in light of dioxin, nuclear waste, oil spills, agent 
orange, PCBs, and the myriad of other chemical poisons with which we 
have covered the earth [sic] [citation omitted].161 
How this critique of Rifkin argues against caution in 
tampering with the Earth is a curious bit of reasoning, indeed.  
Whether the unforeseeable results of introducing transgenic 
animal life are greater than, less than, or just the same as the 
results of the “myriad of . . . chemical poisons with which we 
have covered the [E]arth” or greater than, less than, or just the 
same as the invasions of non-native plant and animal species, 
this argument in favor of patenting transgenic animals sounds 
a loud cautionary note against doing just that.  It would be wise 
to acknowledge Representative Cardin’s simple warning: “[w]e 
must remember biological pollution cannot be recalled.”162 
Circumspection is required before we proceed willy-nilly 
with the creation of transgenic life, and the U.S. patent system, 
with the guidance of Congress, is in a position to direct the PTO 
so that it decides whether and when to grant patents for 
transgenic animals in a manner consistent with the several 
competing public policy concerns implicated by this technology. 
 
 
 
 
 157. Id. 
 158. See id. 
 159. Id. at 13855. 
 160. Manspeizer, supra note 89, at 455 n. 99. 
 161. Id. 
 162. 138 CONG. REC. E1118 (daily ed. Apr. 28, 1992) (statement of Rep. 
Cardin). 
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B. WHAT RESPONSES ARE APPROPRIATE? 
 
1. PTO: The Moral Utility Requirement 
 
Patent law is flexible enough to recognize and adapt to 
changing social values.  As the brief survey of statutes limiting 
people’s property rights in animals reveals,163 these statutes are 
new, all having become part of our legal code within the second 
half of the twentieth century.  Patent law can adapt to limit 
genetic manipulation of animals as well. 
Some have argued that the PTO, itself, might employ the 
“moral utility requirement” of the patent law to deny the 
Rifkin-Newman patent application for a human-animal 
chimera.164  The moral utility requirement is a common law 
doctrine tracing its lineage from Lowell v. Lewis,165 in which 
Justice Story explained that “[a]ll that the law requires is, that 
the invention should not be frivolous or injurious to the well-
being, good policy, or sound morals of society.  The word 
‘useful,’ therefore, is incorporated into the act in 
contradistinction to mischievous or immoral.”166  As examples of 
“mischievous or immoral” inventions, Justice Story cites “a new 
invention to poison people, or to promote debauchery, or to 
facilitate private assassination.”167  While the word “moral” was 
at one time read into the “utility” element of 35 U.S.C. § 101 
with the effect of denying patents to “gambling devices and 
other inventions historically frowned upon by society at 
large,”168 such interpretations of the “utility” requirement have 
largely been abandoned.169 
Nevertheless, there is some indication that the moral 
utility requirement might reemerge.  In 1991, the Federal 
Circuit quoted Justice Story’s “sound morals” language in 
 
 163. See supra text accompanying notes 120-132. 
 164. See Magnani, supra note 1, at 451-54. 
 165. Lowell v. Lewis, 15 F. Cas. 1018, 1019 (D. Mass.1817) (No. 8568) 
(defining “useful” as being in contradistinction to frivolous and mischievous 
rather than a superior invention). 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Magnani, supra note 1, at 451-54. (citing DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM 
ON PATENTS § 4.03 (1998)). 
 169. See id. at 454. 
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defining the word “utility” in Tol-o-Matic, Inc. v. Proma 
Produkt-Und Marketing Gesellschaft.170  Furthermore, as 
recently as 1998, the PTO cited both Lowell and Tol-o-Matic in 
a “Media Advisory” specifically addressing the possibility of 
rejecting transgenic patents on moral grounds.171  Importantly, 
the PTO, in this case, was addressing the patenting of a 
“human/non-human chimera,” not a pure transgenic animal, 
per se.172  However, the PTO does not define how many human 
genes an animal must have to qualify as a “human/non-human 
chimera,” and many animals are patented with at least one 
human gene.173  Furthermore, the PTO speaks of the morality 
requirement in broad terms.  In stating why it might consider a 
“human/non-human chimera” not patentable, the PTO Media 
Advisory states that such an application “would fail to meet the 
public policy and morality aspects of the utility requirement.”174  
The PTO, thus, breathes life into both “public policy” and 
“morality” as grounds for considering patents.175  It does not 
refer to these elements of the “utility requirement” as 
specifically limited to human/non-human chimeras.176  It cites 
these elements as a regular feature of patent law.177 
Denying patent protection for the sake of public policy or 
morality is neither archaic nor beyond the scope of reason.  
Indeed, in Chakrabarty Chief Justice Burger emphasized that 
the Court was not judging whether multi-cellular animals 
should be patented but merely whether the language of 35 
U.S.C. § 101 included such animals.178  He invited Congress “to 
amend § 101 so as to exclude from patent protection organisms 
produced by genetic engineering” if Congress wished to exclude 
“living things” from patent protection.179  And Chief Justice 
Burger cited as an example of a federal statute denying patent 
protection to an invention that contravenes the public good 42 
 
 170. 945 F.2d 1546, 1553 (Fed. Cir. 1991), abrogated on other grounds by 
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 
 171. See Facts on Patenting Life Forms Having a Relationship to Humans, 
Media Advisory, 98-6, (visited Aug. 28, 2000) <http://www.uspto.gov/web/ 
offices/com/speeches/98-06.htm> [hereinafter Facts]. 
 172. Id. 
 173. The Harvard Mouse, for example, has a human gene. 
 174. Facts, supra note 171. 
 175. Id. 
 176. See id. 
 177. See id. 
 178. 447 U.S. at 318. 
 179. Id. 
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U.S.C. § 2181(a), which “exempt[s] from patent protection 
inventions ‘useful solely in the utilization of special nuclear 
material or atomic energy in an atomic weapon.’”180  Similarly 
35 U.S.C. § 287(c) exempts from liability for patent 
infringement any “medical practitioner” who performs a 
“medical activity,” thus freeing medical practices for their 
beneficial uses.181 
 
2. Congress: Proposed Legislative Responses 
 
Congress has, indeed, taken some steps to take up Chief 
Justice Burger’s challenge.  Whether or not the PTO moves to 
postpone or proscribe transgenic animal patents based on the 
Moral Utility Requirement, Congress can and should revive 
these efforts.  Immediately after the April 1987 PTO ruling 
that “nonnaturally occurring non-human multicellular 
organisms, including animals, [are] patentable subject matter 
within the scope of 35 U.S.C. s. 101,”182 Representative Robert 
W. Kastenmeier (D. Wisc.) encouraged the PTO to impose an 
eight-month moratorium on issuing such patents.183  The PTO 
agreed,184 however it issued the patent for the Harvard Mouse 
shortly after the moratorium expired.185  Representative 
Kastenmeier then ushered the Transgenic Animal Patent 
Reform Act (H.R. 4970) through the House of Representatives; 
however, the bill never became law.186 
The several above-mentioned concerns over the patenting 
of transgenic animals have reached Congress, resulting in a 
flurry of proposed legislation.  Since Rep. Kastenmeier’s bill 
many others have been introduced.  Former Senator Mark 
Hatfield, the author of several bills intended to restrict 
transgenic animal patents,187 has expressed concern that “the 
 
 180. 42 U.S.C. § 2181(a). 
 181. 35 U.S.C. § 287(c). 
 182. See supra note 4. 
 183. See Edmund J. Sease, From Microbe to Corn Seeds, to Oysters, to Mice: 
Patentability of New Life Forms, 38 DRAKE L. REV. 551, 565 n. 85 (1988-1989). 
 184. See id. 
 185. See supra note 8. 
 186. See id. 
 187. See, e.g., S. 1291 102nd Cong. (1991) (imposing a five-year moratorium 
on the granting of patents on invertebrate or vertebrate animals to provide 
Congress time to examine issues raised by such patents); S. 387, 103rd Cong. 
(1993) (imposing a two-year moratorium on patenting certain human tissues 
and animal organisms to provide Congress time to examine issues raised by 
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most difficult biomedical ethical issues of our time . . . [have] 
linger[ed] with little guidance or dialogue.”188  Hatfield argues 
that “Congress may act to significantly restrict or alter the 
Patent and Trademark Office policy of patenting animals. . .;”189 
therefore, he argues, “Congress–as the elected representatives 
of the people–must play a role in making these important 
decisions” (emphasis added).190  Senator Hatfield “introduced 
legislation to place a moratorium on allowing the [PTO] to issue 
patents on living organisms” in every session of Congress 
between 1987 and 1995.191  However, despite frequent calls for 
Congressional oversight,192 the PTO, as Senator Hatfield puts 
it, continues to decide the nuances of the current law’s 
applicability “aided only by centuries old patent law.”193  
Senator Hatfield’s “Life Patenting Moratorium Act of 1993” 
called for a two-year moratorium during which no “genetically 
engineered animal shall be considered patentable subject 
matter.”194  As his reasons for slowing the progress of patenting 
transgenic life, Senator Hatfield noted that “[t]he rapid 
advances in biotechnology and biomedical research capabilities 
are creating a wide range of ethical, legal, economic, 
environmental, international and social issues, including 
concerns about the patenting of life forms, eugenics, genetic 
discrimination, and conflicts of interest for biomedical 
researchers. . . .”195 
A sample of the bills introduced in Congress as a result of 
the transgenic animal patent boom include the “Transgenic 
Animal Patent Reform Act,”196 the “Transgenic Animal 
Regulatory Reform Act,”197 the “Transgenic Animal Patent 
Improvement Act,”198 and the “Life Patenting Moratorium Act 
 
such patents). 
 188. Hatfield, supra note 94, at 5. 
 189. S. 387, 103rd Cong. § 2(6) (1993). 
 190. Hatfield, supra note 94, at 5. 
 191. Hatfield, supra note 94, at 6.  Absent committee reports, there is little 
documentary evidence to explain why each of these several bills did not 
emerge from their committees to be debated on the floor. 
 192. See Dresser, supra note 1, at n. 2; Manspeizer, supra note 89, at 419 
n.17. 
 193. Hatfield, supra note 94, at 6. 
 194. S. 387, 103rd Cong. (1993) § 3. 
 195. Id. § 2. 
 196. H.R. 1556, 101st Cong. (1989). 
 197. H.R. 1557, 101st Cong. (1989). 
 198. H.R. 5598, 101st Cong. (1990). 
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of 1993.”199  These bills have been sponsored or co-sponsored by 
twenty-one different members of the House and the Senate.200  
While these Members of Congress are united in their opposition 
to or concern about patenting transgenic animal life, their 
reasons, and, therefore, their proposed solutions, vary widely. 
Benjamin Cardin has been among the most outspoken 
Members of Congress on the subject of patenting transgenic 
animals, expressing several different concerns.  On the subject 
of corporate consolidation of the means of agribusiness, he has 
predicted that “[i]n years to come there could be increasing 
competition for corporate control and ownership of the gene 
pool of animal species.”201  Reflecting the concerns some small 
farmers have about this phenomenon, Rep. Cardin continued, 
The most immediate economic effect of this policy could be 
felt in agriculture, where the major chemical[,] biotechnology, 
and pharmaceutical companies could conceivably position 
themselves to take over animal husbandry.  The Patent Office 
has confirmed farmers will have to pay patent fees every time 
they breed a patented animal or sell part of their herds which 
contain such patented animals.  This will also be true for 
researchers using patented laboratory animals.  The economic 
consequences of animal patenting on small farmers and 
research institutions need to be carefully examined.202 
Congressman Cardin has also expressed concern that 
genetically engineered animals could destroy native species 
either directly (by breeding with the natural animals, thereby, 
permanently altering their gene pool) or indirectly (through 
behavior such as displacing native species from their habitat, 
over population, or over consumption).203  As a result, his bill 
(identical to one offered in the Senate by Senator Hatfield) calls 
for a five-year moratorium on the patenting of transgenic 
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animals.204 
Other bills have approached the subject of restraining the 
growth of transgenic animal patents differently.  
Representative Kastenmeier advocates regulation of the 
technology rather than retardation of it.  His “Transgenic 
Animal Regulatory Reform Act” called for establishing a 
“Biotechnology Science Coordinating Committee” comprising 
members of relevant administrative agencies.205  This 
committee would “serve as a coordinating forum for addressing 
scientific problems, sharing information, and developing 
consensus with respect to methods for evaluating potential 
risks to human health and the environment which are or may 
be caused by genetically-engineered animals.”206  This 
committee would foster consensus and would promote 
“consisten[t]” and “good” laboratory and manufacturing 
practices.207  Representative Kastenmeier’s bill would also 
“protect[] . . . agricultural resources” by issuing temporary, 
renewable permits, without which “no person may use a 
genetically-engineered animal in an agricultural activity.”208  
While Rep. Kastenmeier’s Biotechnology Science Coordinating 
Committee never saw the light of day, President Clinton 
authorized a National Bioethics Advisory Commission, the 
function of which is to, inter alia, advise government agencies 
on the ethics of human genetic research.209 
Yet another group of bills proffered in response to the 
flourishing animal patent industry attempted to address the 
concerns small farmers have voiced about being pushed out of 
farming by big agribusiness companies with monopolies on 
animal patents.  The common solution to that concern is to 
grant a “farmers’ exemption” to patent infringement.210  The 
“Transgenic Animal Patent Reform Act,” for example, states 
that “[i]t shall not be an infringement for a person whose 
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occupation is farming to reproduce a patented transgenic farm 
animal through breeding, use such animal in the farming 
operation, or sell such animal or the offspring of such 
animal.”211  While this statute, however, expressly forbade 
selling “the germ cells, semen, or embryos of a patented 
transgenic farm animal,” the “Transgenic Animal Patent 
Improvement Act,” introduced eighteen months later, exempted 
dissemination of the animals if reproduced through 
conventional means.  It stated that “[i]t shall not be an act of 
infringement for a person to . . . use or sell the reproductive 
material, including germ cells, sperm, eggs, or embryos, of [a 
patented transgenic farm animal] in the farming operation.”212  
This modified legislation would have given farmers even 
greater access to such animals than the previous bills’ farmers’ 
exemptions would have.213  In addition to a “farmers’ 
exemption,” several of the bills that have been presented to 
Congress also have an exemption for biomedical research.214 
While the number of bills to regulate the patenting of 
transgenic animals has dropped off in recent years, the upsurge 
in public awareness and concern over genetic modification of 
both plants and animals215 indicates that Congress should 
reconsider the issue afresh.  That such bills have not succeeded 
in the past should not discourage Members of Congress from 
reintroducing some of the old bills or writing new bills aimed at 
restricting the PTO’s patent grants for transgenic animals.  
That the bills did not succeed does not necessarily signal the 
death of the issue.  Public awareness of the issue is growing, 
and the U.S. Congress is rife with examples of legislation which 
was proposed several times, sometimes lying dormant for 
decades before becoming law.  For example, voting rights of 
women were proposed at the very founding of the country, but 
were only realized in 1920.  The line-item veto was proposed 
during the Nixon administration, lay dormant for decades, and 
became law during the Clinton administration.  In 
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Chakrabarty, Chief Justice Burger noted that given the 
language of the patent statute, as a matter of statutory 
interpretation, the Court could only decide the case one way, 
and he challenged Congress to amend the patent statute.216  
Several Members of Congress rose to that challenge, despite 
the relative paucity of public knowledge of or interest in the 
issue.  Now that the public is aware of the issues surrounding 
the patenting of transgenic animals, as well as plants, 
Congress would have a greater chance of passing such 
legislation and should try again.217 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
As the realities of science surpass what only recently 
passed for science fiction,218 Congress should reconsider 
legislation regulating the issuing of patents for transgenic 
animals.  Among the questions that should be faced directly, 
rather than answered by Congress’ lack of action, is what 
animals are patentable.  If most agree that oil-eating microbes 
are appropriately patentable but human-animal chimeras 
(“geeple”?) are not, where is that line to be drawn?  What are 
appropriate uses for transgenic animals?  As long as doing so is 
profitable, business will find new uses for transgenic animals.  
It is easy to imagine transgenic domestic dogs and cats which 
could breed with natural dogs and cats, spreading unforeseen 
genetic defects through pet breeds.  Transgenic nuisance 
animals (crows and squirrels, for example) could be created to 
destroy native populations (through over-consumption of 
resources or territory), leading to a chain-reaction effect on 
ecosystems that require these or other animals.  Freakish 
animals could be created for entertainment purposes without 
adequate attention given to the animal’s potential to suffer.  
Indeed, one man has inserted a jellyfish gene into a domestic 
rabbit to create a glow-in-the-dark rabbit, which he considers a 
work of art.219 
It is too late to put the technological genie back into the 
bottle.  We have and always will have the technology to 
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genetically manipulate non-human and human animals.  
However, this process must be controlled before greater or 
lesser harm is caused to humans, to the environment, or to the 
animals, themselves.  Congress must pass, and the President 
must sign, legislation to create a supervisory committee to 
determine the advisability and ethics of allowing patents on 
whatever genetically-manipulated animal is profitable. 
Otherwise, before we can teach our children “Old 
Macdonald,” we will first have to ask, “What sound does a geep 
make?” 

